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Foreword—King v. Burwell Symposium: 
Comments on the Commentaries (and on 
Some Elephants in the Room) 
David Gamage 
When the Editors of the Pepperdine Law Review asked me to pen a 
response commentary to the essays submitted for their symposium on the 
King v. Burwell case, I agreed only with some reluctance.  As some readers 
of this symposium volume may already be aware, I took an academic leave 
during the time period extending from the summer of 2010 to the summer of 
2012 to accept a position at the Treasury Department’s Office of Tax Policy.  
The portfolio of my Treasury position included the Regulations for Internal 
Revenue Code § 36B (Section 36B)—the Regulations that were being 
challenged in the King v. Burwell1 case.  I must thus clarify at the outset that 
nothing I write in this response commentary should be taken as indicative of 
the views of the Treasury Department, the Obama Administration, or anyone 
other than myself. 
The thrust of my response commentary will be to praise the submitted 
essays for their excellence and insightfulness, but to suggest that the 
submitted essays nonetheless might benefit from focusing more on the role 
of the political mobilization that resulted in the King v. Burwell dispute. 
The essays submitted for this symposium volume largely concentrate on 
the implications of the King v. Burwell decision for the future of Chevron 
deference, both in tax and non-tax contexts.  Accordingly, Professor 
Johnson’s essay argues that Chevron deference “is now receding in tax”2 and 
that, more generally, we are now seeing the Chevron doctrine’s “fall in tax 
and elsewhere; a fall in substantive significance, although perhaps not 
frequency of citation.”3 
Professor Johnson argues persuasively, yet some of the other submitted 
essays express greater uncertainty about the implications of the King v. 
Burwell decision for the future of Chevron deference.  For instance, 
 
 1. 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015). 
 2. Steve R. Johnson, The Rise and Fall of Chevron in Tax: From the Early Days to King and 
Beyond, 2015 PEPP. L. REV. 19 (2015). 
 3. Id. at 26. 
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Professors Hoffer and Walker argue that it remains to be seen “whether the 
Chief in King v. Burwell intended to cause a sea change in administrative 
law or was thinking like a tax lawyer and crafting a major questions doctrine 
that is good for tax only.”4 
Notably, Professor Lederman, Mr. Dugan, and Professor Hickman all 
see a divergence between Chief Justice Roberts and some of the other 
Justices on what the future of Chevron deference should be. Lederman and 
Dugan discuss the prior disagreement between the Chief Justice and Justice 
Scalia in the earlier case of City of Arlington v. FCC,5 concluding that the 
King v. Burwell decision may signify that “Chief Justice Robert’s ‘massive 
revision’ to Chevron, decried by Justice Scalia in City of Arlington, may be 
gaining traction” and that “[i]t will be interesting to see how the doctrine 
evolves in the coming Terms.”6  Along similar lines, Professor Hickman 
agrees that the King v. Burwell decision is a product of Chief Justice 
Robert’s goal of revising the Chevron doctrine.7  However, Professor 
Hickman argues that “it is unlikely that a majority of the Court agrees 
wholeheartedly with Chief Justice Roberts’s preferred view of Chevron’s 
scope.”8  Nevertheless, Professor Hickman wonders whether lower courts 
might be influenced by the King v. Burwell decision and so give less 
deference to Treasury regulations in future cases.9  This concern is expressed 
even more strongly by Professor Aprill, who predicts (with regret and with 
hope that her prediction will prove to be in error) that the King v. Burwell 
decision will embolden the Tax Court in particular to give less deference to 
Treasury Regulations going forward.10 
Professor Aprill’s concern is amplified by her view that “[t]he Supreme 
Court in King v. Burwell gave no guidance as to when a law involves issues 
of such economic or political significance that judicial, rather than 
administrative, interpretation is needed.”11  As Professors Hoffer and Walker 
explain, the King v. Burwell decision “broke new ground in administrative 
law, ruling that Chevron deference does not apply to questions such as this 
 
 4. Stephanie Hoffer & Christopher J. Walker, Is the Chief Justice a Tax Lawyer?, 2015 PEPP. L. 
REV. 33, 46 (2015). 
 5. Leandra Lederman & Joseph C. Dugan, King v. Burwell: What Does it Portend for 
Chevron’s Domain?, 2015 PEPP. L. REV. 72, 79–80 (2015). 
 6. Id. at 81. 
 7. See Kristin E. Hickman, The (Perhaps) Unintended Consequences of King v. Burwell, 2015 
PEPP. L. REV. 56, 57–58 (2015). 
 8. Id. at 53; see also id. at 66–67. 
 9. Id. at 70–71. 
 10. Ellen P. Aprill, King v. Burwell and Tax Court Review of Regulations, 2015 PEPP. L. REV. 6,  
17–18 (2015). 
 11. Id. at 17. 
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one that are of ‘deep economic and political significance.’”12 
Ultimately, then, what does this new limitation to Chevron deference 
mean or stand for?  In particular, what might constitute a question of “deep 
economic and political significance” so that Chevron deference might not 
apply under this new limitation? 
I view myself as a tax lawyer and a scholar of tax law and policy, not as 
a Court watcher.  I will thus refrain from making predictions about the future 
of the Supreme Court’s Chevron jurisprudence.  Nevertheless, it seems to 
me that there are some metaphorical “elephants in the room”—that is, under-
analyzed aspects of the King v. Burwell dispute that likely shaped the 
decision and that may influence its future impact. 
Without question, I found all of the submitted Essays to be excellent, 
and I learned a great deal from their thoughtful commentary.  Yet I remain 
doubtful that the King v. Burwell decision is best understood as part of a 
larger battle over the nature of Chevron deference in general, rather than, 
instead, as a particularized response to a highly political challenge to the 
signature legislative achievement of the Obama Administration. 
Put another way, I suspect that key to understanding the King v. Burwell 
decision are some highly political “elephants” in the room, and, to mix 
metaphors, some highly political “donkeys” in the room as well. 
In this, I differ somewhat from Professor Grewal, whose essay questions 
why tax professors were not more engaged in analyzing the King v. Burwell 
dispute prior to the Supreme Court’s decision (and this symposium on that 
decision).13  I certainly agree with the main thrust of Professor Grewal’s 
argument that tax professors should be more engaged in cases like this, 
especially seeing as the intersections of taxation and health care are likely to 
be a growth area over the coming decades.14  However, I view the political 
nature of the King v. Burwell dispute as the primary explanation for tax 
professors’ reticence, even though I agree with Professor Grewal’s argument 
that this does not justify that reticence.15 
The King v. Burwell dispute has sometimes been framed as a conflict 
between the literal wording of portions of section 36B and the broader 
structure and purpose of the Affordable Care Act.  However, as Darien 
Shanske and I have argued previously, the literal wording of Section 36B is 
 
 12. Hoffer & Walker, supra note 4, at 40 (quoting King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 
(2015)). 
 13. See Andy S. Grewal, King v. Burwell: Where Were the Tax Professors?, 2015 PEPP. L. REV. 
48 (2015). 
 14. See David Gamage, Perverse Incentives Arising from the Tax Provisions of Healthcare 
Reform: Why Further Reforms are Needed to Prevent Avoidable Costs to Low- and Moderate-
Income Workers, 65 TAX L. REV. 669 (2012) (discussing intersections of taxation and health care). 
 15. Grewal, supra note 13, at 51–53. 
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actually in accord with the government’s position once it is recognized that 
the term “Exchange” is defined by the statute as a term of art.16  Moreover, 
even were this not so, the Supreme Court has long held that the literal 
wording of terms in a provision of the Internal Revenue Code must give way 
when in strong tension with the provision’s overall structure and purpose.  
As the Court wrote in the famous case of Crane v. Commissioner, taught in 
most introductory courses on tax law, “It was thought to be decisive that one 
section of the Act must be construed so as not to defeat the intention of 
another or to frustrate the Act as a whole. . . .”17  Since the beginning days of 
the income tax, the Treasury Department has used its authority granted by 
Congress to “prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement 
of” the tax law18 and has frequently issued Regulations pursuant to that 
authority that depart far more dramatically from the literal wording of Code 
provisions than was the case with Section 36B.19 
Consequently, if the Treasury Department was correct in its view as to 
the structure and purpose of the disputed language of section 36B, then I do 
not think there can be any real doubt that Treasury had the authority to write 
its interpretation into the Section 36B Regulations.  To hold otherwise would 
be to overturn the history of how the income tax laws have been 
administered in this country. 
Of course, those who supported the challenge to the Treasury 
Department’s Regulation espoused a different and competing view of the 
structure and purpose of the disputed language of Section 36B.  This 
competing view understood Congress as having limited the availability of 
the premium tax credits to only States that established their own Exchanges 
and having done so for the purpose of coercing the States to establish their 
own Exchanges. 
Without delving further into the nature and origins of these two 
competing visions, I think most commentators who followed the dispute 
would agree that the advocates of these competing visions grouped into two 
distinct camps that evolved to form two separate and incompatible epistemic 
communities.  Accordingly, the debates between these two camps were then 
largely based on these camps having different worldviews and social 
 
 16. David Gamage & Darien Shanske, Why the Affordable Care Act Authorizes Tax Credits on 
the Federal Exchanges, 71 STATE TAX NOTES 229 (2014). 
 17. Crane v. Comm’r, 331 U.S. 1, 13 (1947). 
 18. I.R.C. § 7805(a) (2012). 
 19. For instance, consider the “check-the-box regulations” as discussed in Gregg D. Polsky, Can 
Treasury Overrule the Supreme Court?, 84 B.U. L. REV. 185 (2004), or the regulations on the 
deductibility of education expenses as discussed in Jay Katz, The Deductibility of Education Costs: 
Why Does Congress Allow the IRS to Take Your Education So Personally?, 17 VA. TAX REV. 1 
(1997). 
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networks rather than being based on more lawyerly analysis. 
I suspect that it is for this reason that Chief Justice Roberts felt 
compelled to uphold the Treasury Department’s Regulation without granting 
Chevron deference.  If the Chief Justice agreed with the Treasury 
Department as to the purpose and structure of the disputed language of 
Section 36B (as I am confident that he did), then the only plausible 
interpretation of the disputed language is that premium tax credits should be 
available in all States.  But deference to the Treasury Department could not 
be the reason for upholding this interpretation.  After all, what if the 
Treasury Department had been controlled by the other epistemic community 
with its different worldview? 
It is perhaps regrettable that the King v. Burwell decision did not better 
clarify what constitutes a question of “deep economic and political 
significance” for the purposes of Chevron deference.  It now remains to be 
seen how this notion might evolve through future cases.  The insightful 
essays in this symposium volume will undoubtedly help guide that future 
evolution.  Nevertheless, I think we should keep in mind the special political 
nature of the King v. Burwell dispute.  It might be that what ultimately made 
this a question of deep economic and political significance was not anything 
inherent to the content or subject matter of the disputed provision itself but 
rather was the political mobilization of epistemic communities around 
interpretations based on incompatible worldviews that occurred subsequent 
to the passage of the legislation. 
 
